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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRAYLOR BROTHERS, INC., 
FRUNIN-COLNON AND COMMERCIAL 
UNION INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
vs. 
DARRELL W. OVERTON and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Applicants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 860460 
Industrial Commission No. 
85000089 & 85000724 
(Argument Priority No. 6) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the Industrial Commission correct in concluding that 
the applicant, Darrell W. Overton, was injured in a compensable 
industrial accident which entitled him to his full award of 
compensation benefits, without a 15% reduction of benefits 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-14• 
More specifically, the issue may be stated as follows: Given 
the facts and circumstances of this case, is §35-1-14 
U.C.A. applicable such that an award of benefits may be reduced by 
15%? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
§35-1-84. Furnishing and certifying proceed-
ings and transcript to Supreme Court—Power of 
court to affirm or set aside award—Grounds 
for setting aside.—Upon the filing of the 
action for review the court shall direct the 
commission to furnish and certify to the 
Supreme Court, within twenty days, all 
proceedings and the transcript of evidence 
taken in the case, and the matter shall be 
determined upon the record of the commission 
as certified by it. Upon such review the 
court may affirm or set aside such award, but 
only upon the following grounds: 
1) That the commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers; 
2) That the findings of fact do not support 
the award. 
§35-1-85. Duty of commission to make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law—Filing— 
Conclusiveness on questions of fact—Review— 
Court judgment.—After each formal hearing, it 
shall be the duty of the commission to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
writing and file the same with its secretary. 
The findings and conclusions of the commission 
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and 
final and shall nob be subject to review; such 
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts 
and the findings and conclusions of the 
commission. The commission and every party to 
the action or proceeding before the commission 
shall have the right to appear in the review 
proceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall 
enter judgment either affirming or setting 
aside the award. 
§35-1-14. Penalty for failure to use safety 
device.—Where injury is caused by the willful 
failure of the employee to use safety devices 
where provided by the employer, or from the 
employee's willful failure to obey any order 
or reasonable rule adopted by the employer for 
the safety of the employee, or from the 
intoxication of the employee, compensation 
provided for herein shall be reduced fifteen 
per cent, except in case of injury resulting 
in death. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition by 
the Industrial Commission. 
This case arises under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
The applicant, Darrell W. Overton filed an Application for Hearing 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah on January 22, 1985 so as 
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to have determined the amount of compensation benefits which he 
was entitled to for compensable industrial injuries incurred. (R 
25.) An evidentiary hearing was held on December 4, 1985. (R 
37.) On May 13, 1986 an Order was entered by Administrative Law 
Judge Janet L. Moffit entitling Mr. Overton to a full award of 
benefits. More specifically, Judge Moffit held that 
U.C.A. §35-1-14 was inapplicable in this case and therefore a 15% 
reduction of benefits was improper. (R 316 - 317.) 
On June 25, 1986 appellants moved for review of the Order, 
challenging the denial of the 15% reduction of benefits. (R 
328.) The Industrial Commission denied the Motion for Review, and 
they adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Administrative Law Judge. (R 345.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Applicant, Darrell Overton was employed by Traylor 
Brothers, Inc. as an engineer in charge of survey work. (R 42.) 
2. Overton was not scheduled to work on August 16, 1983, but 
he was on 24 hour-a-day call. (R 52, 100.) 
3. On August 16, 1983, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Overton 
went on a picnic with his family. (R 50.) During the course of 
the day Overton consumed 12 to 14 beers. He did not have anything 
to drink after 6:30 p.m. 
4. After returning home from the picnic, one of Overton's 
crew members who was scheduled to work the graveyard shift 
indicated to Overton that he was not going to be able to go 
to work and was thinking about quitting because of some problems 
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he was having with another supervisor• Because of the emergency 
situation, Overton agreed to work the graveyard shift and allow 
the crew member to have the night off. (R 52.) 
5. Overton slept from about 6;30 to 8:30 p.m. that evening. 
He then got into the company truck and drove to Duchesne to get 
gas which he charged to his employer's account. He also stopped 
by Traylor Brothers office to pick up his transit, level and 
calculator. (R 53, 54.) 
6. After picking up his equipment, Overton left for the job 
site which was about 45 miles away. (R 55.) 
7. Overton turned off of the main road onto a road which had 
several large potholes. He swerved to miss a pothole, and as he 
did so, his vehicle struck a sandy portion of the road and he lost 
control, which caused the vehicle to roll at least one time. (R 
55, 56.) The accident cause significant injury to Mr. Overton. 
(R 59.) There were no witnesses to the accident. (R 102.) 
8. After the accident, Overton had the presence of mind to 
start the truck up again to drive himself back to Duchesne to seek 
medical attention. (R 56, 57.) 
9. When Overton reached Duchesne, he was stopped by a member 
of the Sheriff's office, taken to the police station and charged 
with driving under the influence of alcohol. (R 57.) 
10. The "Investigating Officer's Report of Traffic Accident" 
indicates the following: The road surface was wet. The light 
condition was dark with no street lights. It was raining. The 
road was curved. The report further indicates that there were 
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three "contributing circumstances11: 1) speed too fast; 2) drove 
left of center line; and 3) D.U.I, (alcohol). (R 335.) 
11. Overton denies that he was traveling about 88 miles per 
hour. (R 96.) 
12. Overton at no time in the proceedings conceded that 
there should be a 15% reduction in the benefits he was to receive. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
U.C.A. §35-1-14 allows an employer to reduce compensation 
benefits payable by 15% if the employee's injury was caused by his 
intoxication. The Industrial Commission held that this statute 
was inapplicable in the case at bar because the employee's 
intoxication was not willful, nor was it the cause of the injury. 
The Industrial Commission's decision denying the 15% reduc-
tion in benefits was not arbitrary or capricious. Rather, it was 
a decision reasonably reached on the basis of evidence in the 
record. Because the decision was a reasoned one with evidence in 
support thereof, it is not subject to remand by this Court. 
U.C.A. §35-1-14 implies that the intoxication of the employee 
must be willful to warrant a 15% reduction in benefits. Because 
Mr. Overton's intoxication was not willful, this statute is 
inapplicable and the benefits awarded may not be reduced. 
Even if this Court concludes that the employee's intoxication 
need not be willful to warrant a reduction in benefits, U.C.A. 
§35-1-14 is still inapplicable because Mr. Overton's intoxication 
was not the proximate cause of his accident and consequent 
injuries. 
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The issue of reduction of benefits pursuant to U.C.A. 
§35-1-14 was before the Industrial Commission necessarily, because 
it is a defense to applicant's claims for compensation. Further, 
inasmuch as this is an affirmative defense, the onus is upon 
the employer to assert the defense and present evidence in support 
thereof. Traylor Brothers failed to present such evidence and 
should be barred from doing so at a later date. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH 
DENIED A 15% REDUCTION IN THE COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS AWARDED TO THE APPLICANT, 
MR. OVERTON, WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, 
WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE, OR WITHOUT ANY SUBSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT; AND THEREFORE THE 
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY NOT BE 
OVERTURNED. 
The appellant in the case at bar contends that the Industrial 
Commission erred in concluding that the compensation benefits 
which Mr. Overton is entitled to are not subject to a 15% reduc-
tion. Appellant - Traylor Brothers have petitioned this Court to 
review the Commission's Order denying a 15% reduction of the 
1 
benefits. 
The standard of review which has been utilized by this Court 
in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous 
1. U.C.A. §35-1-84 and §35-1-85 statutorily define the duty 
of the commission to make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, and the power of the Utah Supreme Court to 
review these findings. 
See text of these statutes supra at pp. 1 & 2. 
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cases which have articulated the power or scope of review which 
the Utah Supreme Court possesses with regard to decisions handed 
down by the Industrial Commission. 
One such case which clearly sets forth the proper standard is 
Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). 
In Kaiser the Court stated: 
Under any of these standards . . . it is 
apparent that this Court's function in 
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a 
strictly limited one in which the question is 
not whether the Court agrees with the 
Commission's findings or whether they are 
supported by the preponderance of evidence. 
Instead, the reviewing court's inquiry is 
whether the Commission's findings are 
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence" to support 
them. Only then should the Commissions 
findings be displaced. 631 P.2d at 890. 
Another case which addressed the issue of this Court's scope 
of review is Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 256 
(Utah 1980): 
When the Commission remains unpersuaded on a 
question of fact, this Court does not disagree 
therewith and compel such a finding unless the 
evidence is such that all reasonable minds 
would so find, and the court would thus so 
rule as a matter of law. On the contrary, if 
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence 
(or lack of evidence) such that reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon could remain 
unpersuaded, this Court does not upset the 
determination made. 
606 P.2d at 258, 259. 
See also the very recent case of Hodges v. Western Piling and 
Sheeting Company, 717 P.2d 718, 720 (Utah 1986) wherein this Court 
stated, "In reviewing questions of fact, this Court gives great 
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deference to the Commission's findings. Only where the findings 
are without foundation in the evidence will the court reverse." 
Accordingly, applying the above-cited authority to the case 
at bar, the Supreme Court is powerless to overturn the Industrial 
Commission's order unless it can be said that based upon the 
entire record, the Industrial Commission clearly acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in denying a 15% reduction of the benefits due 
Mr. Overton. 
An examination of the record makes it clear that the 
Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining 
the propriety of a 15% reduction of the benefits due, and there-
fore the order must stand. 
The Commission (adopting the findings of the Administrative 
Law Judge) found that there was no proof that the applicant lost 
control of his vehicle because of intoxication. That is to say, 
the Commission remained unpersuaded as to an issue of fact. 
Specifically, the Commission was left unpersuaded that intoxi-
cation was the cause of Mr. Overton's accident and consequent 
injuries. Thus, according to Martinson, in order for this court 
to disagree with the Commission, and compel a finding that 
intoxication was in fact the cause of the accident, it is 
requisite that all reasonable minds would so conclude. On the 
other hand, if there appears to be a reasonable basis in the 
evidence (or lack thereof) such that reasonable minds could remain 
unpersuaded that intoxication caused Mr. Overton's accident, then 
it is not within this Court's power to upset the Commission's 
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determination. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to scrutinize the record and 
discern whether or not the Commission's findings have a reasonable 
foundation in the evidence. If the record reveals evidence such 
that a reasonable mind could conclude that something other than 
intoxication caused the accident, then this Court is powerless to 
reverse the Commission's order. 
An examination of the "Investigating Officer's Report of 
Traffic Accident" indicates that there are numerous factors which 
may have caused or contributed to the accident. (R 335.) This 
report shows that at the time of the accident the road surface was 
wet and the light condition was dark with no street lights. 
Further, it was raining at the time of the accident; and the "road 
character" was defined as "curved". The investigating officer 
identified the following three factors as "contributing circum-
stances" to the accident: 1) speed too fast; 2) drove left of the 
center; and 3) alcohol. Of these three circumstances, "speed too 
fast" was labeled as the "prime contributor". 
In addition to the aforementioned accident report, there is 
testimony in the record which indicates that something other than 
intoxication may have been the cause of the accident. Mr. Overton 
testified that the road on which he was driving contained many 
large potholes, and it was the avoidance of one of these potholes 
which caused Overton to lose control of the truck. (R 56.) 
Further, Overton testified that at the time of the accident, he 
was not feeling the effects of alcohol. (R 57.) Inasmuch as the 
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alcohol which Overton had consumed was consumed over the course of 
an entire day, coupled with the fact that he had not drunk any 
liquor in the three hours immediately preceding the accident, it 
is reasonable to assume that the amount of alcohol in 
Mr. Overton's blood was not significant enough to impair his 
driving so as to cause the accident. 
Therefore, when the entire record is inspected - the investi-
gating officer's accident report, taken in conjunction with 
Overton's testimony - it is certainly reasonable to conclude that 
perhaps one of the other variables (other than alcohol) was the 
cause of the accident. Thus, because there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence such that reasonable minds could reach the same 
conclusion as did the Commission, the findings are not arbitrary 
and capricious, and therefore are not subject to being displaced. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN 
CONCLUDING THAT §35-1-14 U.C.A. IMPLIES THAT 
WILLFUL CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE EMPLOYEE IS 
NECESSARY IN ORDER TO WARRANT A 15% REDUCTION 
IN BENEFITS AWARDED TO THE EMPLOYEE. 
Appellant contends that because Mr. Overton was intoxicated 
at the time of the accident, §35-1-14 U.C.A. necessarily is 
applicable. Respondents take exception to this reasoning and 
maintain that this statute implies that the employee's intoxica-
tion be of a willful nature before his benefits are subject to 
reduction. Accordingly, it is respondent's position that even if 
Mr. Overton's intoxication did cause the accident (a contention 
which respondents strongly refute) the intoxication was not of a 
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willful character and therefore §35-1-14 is inapplicable and the 
compensation benefits may not be reduced. 
In support of appellant's contention, they cite Lopez 
v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 660 P.2d 250 (Utah 1983). In Lopez, 
claimant appealed from a decision of the Industrial Commission 
reducing the amount of his workmen's compensation benefits by 
15%. This Court held that pursuant to §35-1-14 U.C.A., if an 
accident resulting in a claimant's compensable injury was due to 
claimant's intoxication, compensation benefits are to be reduced 
by 15%. 
Lopez however, may clearly be distinguished from the case at 
bar and is not dispositive of the issue presently before the 
Court. Referring to Lopez, appellants state, "In citing the 
pertinent part of §35-1-14, this court did not include any mention 
that the intoxication must be willful." (Appellant's Brief p. 9.) 
A reasonable explanation as to why the court did not include 
any mention as to whether or not the intoxication must be willful, 
is because that was not an issue in the case. Lopez was concerned 
not with the willfulness of the intoxication, but rather with the 
causal relationship between the accident and the intoxication. 
Although there are no reported Utah cases which have examined 
the narrow issue of whether or not the claimant's intoxication 
need be willful to warrant a reduction in benefits, Van Waters and 
Rogers v. Workman, 700 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1985) provides some insight 
regarding the parameters of §35-1-14 U.C.A. Van Waters involved 
an employer's action seeking to set aside an order of the 
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Industrial Commission denying him a 15% reduction in workmen's 
compensation benefits payable to claimant as a result of an 
industrial accident. Employer contended that his employee 
willfully failed to use safety goggles provided by his employer, 
and that the 15% reduction set out in §35-1-14 U.C.A. should have 
been imposed. While the pertinent part of this statute allows for 
the 15% reduction if "[the] injury is caused by the willful 
failure of the employee to use safety devices where provided by 
the employer . . .", this Court held that the proper standard to 
be employed is "willful and deliberate and in defiance of the 
requirement." 700 P.2d at 1098-1099. That is, in Van Waters the 
employee was provided with a pair of safety goggles, and due to 
exceptional circumstances he decided not to use the goggles. In 
determining whether or not the employee's benefits should be 
reduced, the Court interpreted the statute so that an employee's 
benefits will not be reduced unless his "willful failure" actually 
amounts to something greater than mere "willful". The failure on 
the part of the employee must be willful, deliberate and in 
defiance of the requirement. This interpretation of the statutory 
language yields equitable results inasmuch as the employee's 
benefits will not be reduced if he has a reasonable explanation 
for failing to comply. Such an interpretation is not in deroga-
tion of the statute because a purpose behind the statute - the 
maintenance of safety in the work place - is furthered. In its 
opinion, the Van Waters Court cited with approval 1A. A. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation, §33.40: 
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If the employee had some plausible purpose to 
explain his violation of a rulef the defense 
of violation of safety rules or willful 
misconduct are inapplicable, even though the 
judgment of employee might have been faulty or 
his conduct rash. 
700 P.2d at 1099. 
The rationale of Van Waters is certainly applicable to the 
case at bar. In Van Waters the Court liberally construed §35-1-14 
in favor of fully compensating the employee, thereby achieving an 
equitable result. The court recognized that exceptional circum-
stances may arise such that an employee's failure to adhere to a 
safety rule is excused and full benefits are awarded. The same 
should hold true with regard to the portion of §35-1-14 which 
deals with an employee's intoxication. There are exception-
al circumstances which arise such that it would be inequitable to 
reduce a claimants benefits due to mere employee intoxication. 
Such an exceptional circumstance is present in the case at bar. 
That circumstance being - the claimant was not willfully intoxi-
cated while in the course of his employment. While the claimant 
may have been intoxicated, it was not his desire or plan to engage 
in employment while intoxicated. Rather, in this incidence, 
Mr. Overton was drinking on his time off and came in to work only 
because an emergency required his presence at the job site. 
Overton had no foreknowledge that he was going to be required to 
come in and work, nor could it have reasonably been anticipated. 
Further, after Overton learned that he was to work on the night in 
question, he refrained from drinking any intoxicants. 
Thus, just as in Van Waters wherein there existed exceptional 
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circumstances excusing an employee's willful failure to use a 
safety device, there exist exceptional circumstances in this 
case which should excuse Overton's intoxication. When an employer 
requires an employee to be on 24 hour a day call, it is reasonable 
to assume that the employer extends the scope of his risk and must 
take the employee as he finds him when an emergency arises. 
Overton's intoxication was not in disregard of safety, nor in 
defiance of his employment duties. Rather, Overton had a reason-
able explanation for being intoxicated at work; he was not 
anticipating working until he was sober. 
Accordingly, inasmuch as the applicant did not act in 
disregard of safety, his fellow employees, or his employer, it 
would be unjust and inequitable to reduce the compensation 
benefits which Mr. Overton is entitled to. He should receive the 
full amount of benefits awarded. 
POINT III 
THE FACTS COMPEL A FINDING THAT MR. OVERTON'S 
INJURIES WERE NOT CAUSED BY HIS INTOXICATION. 
Regardless of whether or not Mr. Overton's intoxication is 
characterized as willful, for an employee's benefits to be reduced 
pursuant to §35-1-14 U.C.A., it is necessary that the employee's 
intoxication was the proximate cause of the accident. 
As stated by this Court in Lopez at 251: "Plaintiff is 
correct in his assertion that there must be a causal relationship 
between the accident and the intoxication. However, this is a 
factual determination best left to the Commission." 
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In discussing the requisite causal relationship/ the Lopez 
Court cited several cases from other jurisdictions. One case 
cited by this Court in Lopez was Sztaba v. Great Northern Railway 
Company, 411 P.2d 379 (Mont. 1966). In Sztaba. the Court said: 
The test most generally employed in deter-
mining causation is the "but for" test. 
. . . Proximate cause is one which in a 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by 
any new, independent cause, produces the 
injury, and without which the injury would not 
have occurred. . . . At most, the "but for" 
or "sine qua non" test is but one of exclu-
sion. In other words, [a person's] conduct is 
not the cause of the event, if the event would 
have occurred without it. 
411 P.2d at 385. 
It necessarily follows that by referring to Sztaba, this 
Court has adopted a proximate cause, "but for" test to be utilized 
in determining the causal relationship in cases such as the one at 
bar. This approach is consistent with the view espoused in 1A 
A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, §34.33(a), wherein Larson 
states, "when a statute says merely 'caused by' or 'due to', this 
can refer neither to remote cause nor to sole cause. It must mean 
proximate cause." 
Applying the above cited authority to the present case, it is 
readily apparent that Overton's intoxication was not a proximate 
cause of the accident. This is so because there is ample evidence 
in the record that indicates that the accident would have occurred 
even if Mr. Overton had not been under the influence of alcohol. 
Overton testified that his avoidance of a large pothole was the 
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cause of his accident. The 'Investigating Officer's Report' 
indicates many other possible causes of the accident including 
road and weather conditions* Further, this report cites 'speed 
too fast' as being the prime contributor to the accident. While 
there is much credible evidence in the record to support a finding 
that intoxication was not the cause of the accident, there appears 
to be nothing in the record indicating that Overton's intoxication 
was the cause thereof. Inasmuch as the burden of proof is upon 
the employer to establish both the fact of intoxication and that 
2 the injury was caused by the intoxication, it was proper for the 
Commission to deny a 15% reduction of benefits. 
Haller Beverage Corporation v. Department of Industry, Labor, 
and Human Relations, 49 Wis 2d 233f 181 NW 2d 418 (1970) is a 
case which is very analogous to the case at bar. The facts of 
Haller are as follows: Elmer Walk was employed by Haller Beverage 
Corporation as a liquor salesman. While in the course of employ-
ment , he was killed in a one-car auto accident when his car 
crossed the southbound lane of traffic and struck a bridge 
abutment. There were no witnesses to the accident. A blood 
sample taken revealed .29% alcohol by weight in the blood. The 
employer - Haller Beverage Corp. applied for a 15% decrease in 
compensation payments, alleging that the deceased, at the time of 
his deathf was intoxicated and that his death was the result of 
such intoxication. An administrative hearing was held, and it was 
2. Haller Beverage Corporation v. Department of Industry, 
Labor, and Human Relations, 49 Wis.2d 233, 181 NW 2d 418 
(1970). 
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determined that the deceased was probably intoxicated at the time 
of the accident/ but that the employer failed to meet the burden 
of proof that the fatal injury was the result of intoxication. A 
reduction of compensation benefits was not allowed/ and the 
employer appealed. 
In affirming the decision disallowing a reduction of bene-
fits/ the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
On the issue of intoxication/ the employer and 
insurance carrier relied upon the .29% blood 
test and expert testimony that a person with a 
.29% alcohol by weight in the blood was 
intoxicated. . . . On the issue as to causal 
connection between intoxication and accident/ 
the employer and insurance carrier presented 
no additional proof, by way of expert testi-
mony or otherwise. Instead they relied to 
prove causation upon the absence of evidence 
as to tire blowout/ steering mechanism 
failure/ deer crossing the road or other 
distraction which might account for the car 
hitting the bridge abutment. In meeting a 
burden of proof/ absence of testimony is not 
the same as presence of testimony. It is time 
that the employer and insurance carrier were 
not required to negate all possible explana-
tions of the car veering to hit the abutment. 
But they were required to establish a causal 
link between the condition of intoxication and 
the injury. This they did not do. Their 
expert witness did not testify that the .29% 
alcohol in the bloodf standing alone with no 
corroborating physical evidence/ was the cause 
of the car hitting the abutment. 
181 NW 2d at 419/ 420. 
Just as in Hallery the employer in the present case has 
failed to present any evidence establishing a causal link between 
the employee's intoxication and the injury incurred. Because of 
the want of evidence showing the requisite causal relationship 
between intoxication and injury, the Commission was correct in 
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concluding that Overton's intoxication was not the cause of his 
losing control of the vehicle, 
Furthermoref as stated in Lopez, "[the] causal relationship 
between the accident and the intoxication . . . is a factual 
determination best left to the Commission." 660 P.2d at 251. And 
inasmuch as the Commissions factual determination was not arbi-
trary or capricious, nor without any substantial evidence to 
support it, the Commissions findings on this issue may not be 
overturned. (See discussion at POINT I). That is, if an employer 
fails to convince the Industrial Commission, or if the Commission 
has a reasonable doubt about the intoxication or its causal 
relationship with the injury, then it is incumbent upon the 
Commission to deny a reduction in benefits due an employee. This 
is so because §35-1-14 recognizes that an employee may be intoxi-
cated and while in such condition receive an injury not caused by 
his intoxication. 
See also Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers Inc., 97 Idaho 719, 
552 P.2d 482, 485 (1976) wherein the court stated, "Evidence that 
the employee may have been drinking at the time of the accident 
does not necessarily establish that he was intoxicated at that 
time, nor does a finding that he was intoxicated lead to an 
inevitable conclusion that the intoxication caused the accident." 
See also Tatum - Reese Development Corp. v. Industrial 




THE ISSUE OF REDUCTION OF BENEFITS PURSUANT TO 
§35-1-14 U.C.A. WAS BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION; SAID ISSUE IS AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE WHICH MUST BE ASSERTED AND PROVED BY 
DEFENDANT - EMPLOYER. 
Appellants claim that the issue of reduction of benefits 
pursuant to §35-1-14 U.C.A. was never before the Commission/ and 
therefore their failure to present evidence in support of the 
reduction was justified and excusable. This contention of 
appellants is clearly erroneous as the issue was necessarily 
before the Commission from the outset. 
In support of appellants contention/ they statef "When 
Overton filed for a hearing, he did so on the basis of continuing 
temporary total disability. Although a place was provided in 
paragraph 5(D) on the Application for Overton to challenge the 15% 
reduction/ he did not do so." (Appellant's Brief pg. 12.) This 
is not altogether a correct statement. At best it is misleading. 
On the Application For Hearing form which appellants refer tof 
several reasons are given for the applicants filing of the claim: 
5. This Claim is filed because: [Please [X] appropriate 
box] 
A. [X] Defendants have refused payment of only 
medical expenses. 
B. [X] Compensation has not been paid for time off 
work as shown in question 3 above. [Question 
3 refers to temporary total disability] 
C. [X] Defendants have denied liability for permanent 
partial disability. 
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D. [ ] Other reason . 
E. I am claiming . . . additional medical 
benefits [X]; additional permanent partial 
disability [X]. [R 25.] 
Thus, it appears that Mr. Overton filed his claim not only 
for the purpose of obtaining temporary total disability benefits, 
but for other reasons also. He wanted the Industrial Commission 
to determine the amount of additional medical benefits he was 
entitled to, as well as compensation due for his permanent partial 
disability. 
It should be noted that the parties had never agreed to a 15% 
reduction of benefits. Further, it was not Overton's duty to 
challenge any reduction of benefits. Rather, the onus is upon the 
defendant - employer to go forward with any evidence he has to 
establish the affirmative defense of applicants intoxication. 
Therefore, when Overton filed his Application for Hearing so 
the Industrial Commission could determine what benefits Overton 
was entitled to, any defense to this claim for compensation was 
necessarily an issue. However, for this issue to be determined in 
favor of defendant - employer, it is necessary that the employer 
present evidence in support of his affirmative defense. This he 
did not do. Inasmuch as it was defendants duty to come forth with 
evidence in support of his position, the failure to present any 
such evidence is not excusable, and he should therefore not be 
granted an opportunity at this time to present evidence which he 
neglected to present at the appropriate time. 
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Consistent with respondent - Overton's position is 1A 
A, Larson, Workmen's Compensationy §34.31 at 6-92; 
Since intoxication is an affirmative defense, 
the burden of proof of intoxication and the 
requisite degree of causation is on the 
employer, and when there is a conflict in the 
evidence, a finding by the commission that 
inebriation was not the cause of the accident 
must be affirmed. 
See also Nalley v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 204 
Neb. 370f 282 NW 2d 47, 50 (1979) wherein the court stated;. "And 
finally, it is settled law that the burden of proof in a workmen's 
compensation case on the defense of intoxication is on the 
employer." 
Also see United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. 
Collins, 95 So.2d 456, 459 (Miss. 1957) in which the court held, 
"Moreover, intoxication is an affirmative defense with the burden 
of proof upon the employer pleading it." 
Appellants also claim, "And when testimony on wages began, 
[appellant-employer] indicated that there was no dispute that the 
benefits were to be reduced by 15%. Overton did not disagree. (R 
42.) Thus, the hearing was conducted with the justifiable 
understanding that the 15% reduction was not at issue." 
(Appellant's Brief p. 13.) 
While Overton's attorney did not expressly disagree that 
there was no dispute regarding a reduction in benefits, the 
applicant at no time in the proceedings conceded that there should 
be a 15% reduction in benefits he was to receive. Applicant's 
attorney's response of "thank you" (R 42) was in response to the 
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judges indication to proceed with questioning as opposed to any 
acknowledgment whatsoever that the benefits should be reduced by 
15%. 
Further, because there was no understanding or agreement 
between the parties that the benefits would be reduced, coupled 
with the fact that appellant's attorney made mention of the 15% 
reduction this was an issue properly before the Court. And to 
resolve this issue in favor of the employer, it is requisite that 
the employer present evidence in support of his position. This he 
neglected to do. To allow him to present evidence at a later time 
would be inequitable and a miscarriage of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
In denying a reduction of benefits which are payable to 
Mr. Overton, the Industrial Commission did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously, or wholly without cause. The record clearly shows 
that Overton's intoxication was not the cause of his accident. 
Appellant's failure to present evidence in support of their 
affirmative defense was neglect on their part, and they should not 
be allowed to present evidence at a later date. Accordingly, 
respondents herein respectfully request that the Utah Supreme 
Court affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission which denied a 
reduction in benefits. 
DATED this / day of February, 1987. 
BLACK & MOORE 
/ & / 
Susan B. Diana 
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